

20 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: The Letter to Mr. Bundy on the Killian Board
Recommendations

1. On page 2 I have great difficulty in rationalizing in my own mind just how "intelligence information" can be defined. You will note that the Killian Board would be even more general and require these memoranda from any agency "handling classified material." You limit it to those agencies possessing "intelligence information." I still don't know how to distinguish intelligence information from other information -- at least the area would be so murky as to be murky. Furthermore, your letter proposes that a memorandum be prepared when an employee discusses "classified data" with press representatives. If the data is truly classified, press representatives should not have access to it and the person discussing such data with the press would be violating every security regulation in existence. Obviously then, if this is so, you would be asking him to report his own security violations. This somehow just doesn't seem to make sense to me.

2. I can do no particular violence to pages 3 and 4 as to recommendation "paragraph 6," although intelligence information is no good unless it is made available to the people who must base their planning and judgments on such information. I am right now considering an oral requirement from Ray Cline to open TKH clearances to a considerably larger number of his people so that the information available from TKH sources can be better put to use in the intelligence community. I say again that your leaks do not occur from the workers and the drones -- the type of leak Hanson Baldwin creates comes only from the queens. When the President sees the numbers of people having TKH clearances, he will probably have a litter of barbed wire -- I therefore suggest that you add a paragraph indicating that the vast majority of these clearances are for people who are actually engaged in the analysis of the raw product and in estimating procedures. You might also point out that this list does not include [redacted] clearances nor those in industry and in advisory capacities.

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- 2 -

3. I have grave doubts about your proposals under recommendation "paragraph 8" starting on page 5. It is my opinion that security regulations, security investigations, and the protection of classified information would be a command responsibility based on broad guidelines established by you as the Director of Central Intelligence. I would hesitate to endorse a special group of investigators operating directly under you with any of your hate on, since it would tend to fragment responsibility inherent in command, would relieve the other department heads of their command responsibilities for enforcement of security regulations, etc. I would prefer to see greater emphasis and greater community cooperation placed on our existing facilities of the USIB, augmented as may be necessary to give full-time and perhaps more technical attention to the problem.

4. As to recommendation "paragraph 9" on page 7, this would require the establishment of either a central clearing house for all Congressional appearances, or else a determination by the President that only a single source will provide intelligence information to the Congress.

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